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Abstract: In A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice and the
European Convention on Human Rights, Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan argue
that there has been the emergence of, and increasing prospects for, a cosmopolitan
legal order based on the Convention. This symposium aims to engage with, and to
better explore, the theoretical implications and practical legal ramifications of
their argument. In doing so, this first article acts as a general introduction to the
symposium, laying out the major arguments of the book as well as arguments
presented by the symposium contributors. Moving beyond the summative, this
introduction also situates A Cosmopolitan Legal Oder within broader debates in
global constitutionalism, while defending its use of Kant’s cosmopolitan theory.
Lastly, it explores some of the key implications and challenges that arise from
the symposium itself, rooting these insights within the current context of anti-
globalism, nationalism, populism and neo-sovereigntism, and the corresponding
necessity for a more transitional and pluralistic response as offered in ACosmo-
politan Legal Order.
Keywords: cosmopolitanism; European Convention of Human Rights;
Immanuel Kant; legal cosmopolitanism; public right
I. Introduction
The twenty-first centuryhaswitnessed the rise of twoantitheticalmovements
in international legal theoryandpractice.Onone side, therehasbeena steady























































































































on an emerging global constitutionalism.1On the other side, there has been a
pronounced resurgence of what Peter Shapiro has labelled neo-
sovereigntism,2 with stringent claims for national self-determination, in
which states have both a legal right and a moral duty to opt out of any
international covenant that restricts and/or comes into conflict with demo-
cratic self-legislation.3 This latter movement, which grew under George
W. Bush,4 and has accelerated with the rise of populism in the United States
and Europe, is often seen as directly opposed to ideas of a cosmopolitan legal
order.5Although therearearguments to suggest that thebinarybetween state
self-determination and global constitutionalism is theoretically overplayed,6
in practice present-day dynamics suggest a tension between globalization
and globalism on one side, and particularism and the rise of anti-
globalization sentiment on the other. This potential tension has been accel-
erated (ormademoreobvious)by the impactof international agreements and
international courts on an unprecedented scale: the combined force of the
World TradeOrganization (WTO), the EuropeanUnion (EU)with its Court
of Justice of the EuropeanUnion (CJEU), investment treaty agreements with
arbitral tribunals, the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights (ECtHR) itself with
other regional courts, and the UN system, also empowering domestic courts
in their review of national authorities from which political pushback can
arise. Yet, beyond the political, this also illustrates that, along the way,
international law and human rights acquired teeth.7
It is against this current global backdrop that Alec Stone Sweet and
Clare Ryan propose the emergence of, and increasing prospects for, a
‘cosmopolitan legal order’ based on the European Convention on Human
1 Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge, A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Conver-
gence in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015); Garrett Wallace
Brown, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Global Constitutionalism’ inGlobal Constitutionalism, edited by
Anthony F Lang and Antje Wiener (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019).
2 Peter J Spiro ‘The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets’
(2000) Foreign Affairs, 1–5 December.
3 JohnRBolton and JohnYoo ‘Restore the Senate’sTreaty Power’ (2009)NewYorkTimes, 5
January; Jeremy ARabkin, Law without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires
Sovereign States (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2005).
4 Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell, ‘Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of Interna-
tional Law: Are They Compatible?’ (2008) 16(3) The Journal of Political Philosophy 326.
5 Richard Beardsworth, Garrett Wallace Brown and Richard Shapcott, The State and Cos-
mopolitan Responsibilities (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019).
6 Garrett Wallace Brown, ‘The Idea of Autonomy: Accountability, Self-determinism and
What Normative Claims About Institutional Autonomy in Global Governance Should Mean’
in International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy, edited by Richard Collins andNigel D
White (Routledge, London, 2011).
7 Mads Andenas, ‘Reassertion and Transformation: From Fragmentation to Convergence in
International Law’ (2015) 46(3) Georgetown Journal of International Law 685.






















































































































Rights.8 In order to theoretically ground the ECtHR as a nascent form of
legal cosmopolitanism, the authors propose an applied Kantian framework
to determine a condition of global constitutional justice that is able to
operate both within and beyond the state. By outlining a legal order that
intersects with, and then transcends, both national and international law,
the authors purposely attempt to navigate a course that offers state-based
self-determined constitutionalism with a Kantian cosmopolitan purpose,
thus carefully charting a middle position that might better satisfy cosmo-
politans as well as their milder critics.9
Yet what is particular or even unique about the treatment presented in A
Cosmopolitan Legal Order is that it delivers equal parts of Kantian cosmo-
politanism (Part I) and international legal analysis (Part II), representing a
commanding piece of applied theory. This is different from previous
attempts in legal cosmopolitanism, which have mostly focused on Kantian
legal theory,10 providing only limited interventions in ‘black letter’ legal
analysis.11 As a result, the book resides within, while empirically furthering,
a Habermasian interpretation of ‘international law with a cosmopolitan
purpose’. After Between Facts and Norms12 Jürgen Habermas directed
much of his attention to developing a cosmopolitan approach in the tradi-
tion of Kant’s thinking. In doing so, Habermas addressed the role of the
United Nations and the European Union, as well as the character of inter-
national law and international/European institutions, as representative of
transitional ‘stepping-stones’ towards a CLO.13
8 Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional
Justice, and the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2018).
9 See Benhabib’s discussion regarding this tension in this issue.
10 Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order’
(1998)2KantianReview 72;GeorgCavallar,TheRights of Strangers (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2002);
Otfried Hoffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2006); Garrett Wallace Brown, Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to a
Cosmopolitan Constitution (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2009); Patrick Capps and
Julian Rivers, ‘Kant’s Concept of International Law’ (2010) 16(4) Legal Theory 229; Claudio
Corradetti, ‘Kant’s Legacy and the Idea of a Transitional Jus Cosmopoliticum’ (2016) 29(1)Ratio
Juris 105.
11 See (n 5), Chs 6 and7; (n 8);DavidHirsh,TheLawAgainstGenocide: CosmopolitanTrials
(Taylor and Francis, London, 2012); Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge, ‘The External Effects of
National ECHR Judgments’ (2012)NYU JeanMonnetWorking Paper 07/12 andMads Andenas
and Eirik Bjorge, ‘National Implementation of ECHR Rights: Kant’s Categorical Imperative and
the Convention’ in Andreas Follesdal, Birgit Schlütter and Geir Ulfstein, The European Court of
Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2011).
12 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996).
13 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Is There Still a Chance for the Constitutionalization of Public Interna-
tional Law?’ in JürgenHabermas,TheDividedWest (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006) 115; Jürgen






















































































































The importance of having greater applied balance, as represented by
Stone Sweet and Ryan’s book, cannot be stressed enough. This is because
cosmopolitans and global constitutionalists are seemingly good bedfellows,
where cosmopolitans need to be better applied global constitutionalists,
while global legal constitutionalists need to be more explicitly moral and
legal cosmopolitans. As argued elsewhere, ‘global constitutionalism is inher-
ently normative and clearly operates within the universalist and cosmopol-
itan lexicon . . . the problem, however, is that this interconnection and
interrelation has remained under-explored and often taken for granted’.14
The expansion of international law and courts, and reactions against this
expansion, have spurred a rich and unfocused scholarship from the perspec-
tive of different domestic legal disciplines, in particular constitutional law,
international law and several other disciplines. Beyond the boundaries that
divide law, political science and philosophy, a number of larger research
projects have focused on familiar legitimacy matrices. They may provide
critical perspectives, but they rarely offer much assistance when it comes to
understanding and developing the international legal system and the
responses in national law and politics. Domestic constitutional law often
operates within a Hegelian concept of the state and law, where states’
relationships with one another can only be external, dismissing classic uni-
versalism, Kant and the proposal for perpetual peace as a mere chimera. At
the same time,Kantian concepts are seen as influential inmany national legal
traditions, and indeed are viewed as important to international legal orders
such as the United Nations, the European Union and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. There is an openness towards Kantian legal theory
and legal analysis, but little in the formof sophisticated applied analysis. The
discussions on a EuropeanConstitution and the EUCharter of Rights reflect
the same failures of scholarship and an openness to applied analysis.15
By presenting a balanced treatment of Kantian legal theory and interna-
tional legal analysis, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order helps to advance a more
comprehensive blueprint for how to locate and practically strengthen a
plurality of existing legal orders towards a meaningful cosmopolitan con-
dition. This may strengthen the theoretical foundation of the general dis-
course, including initiatives by states and judgments by courts. AsCorradetti
notes in his contribution to this symposium, this treatment of Kant reaffirms
Habermas, ‘Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und die Legitimationsprobleme einer verfas-
sten Weltgesellschaft’, in Rechtsphilosophie im 21. Jahrhundert, edited by Winifried Brugger,
Ulfrid Neumann and Stephan Kirste (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 2008) 360–62; David Held, Cosmo-
politanism: Ideals and Realities (Policy Press, Cambridge, 2010).
14 See (n 1) 94.
15 MadsAndenas and JohnGardner ‘Introduction: CanEuropeHave aConstitution?’ (2001)
12(1) King’s College Law Journal 1.






















































































































a more moderate ‘transitional’ reading of cosmopolitan law, one that can
better satisfy state-based self-legislation as well as ‘legitimize external rela-
tions of states among themselves’. In his contribution, Bjorge goes a step
further, concluding that the ECtHR has established the only international
legal orderwith the characteristics of aKantianCLO,which he argues iswell
grounded in the legal tradition focused on courts. Again, in line with
Habermas, Corradetti and Bjorge submit that such a transitional model,
with sovereignty dispersed at different levels simultaneously, renders a
process where domestic democratic processes can legitimize international
public authority.16
Although it has been argued that Stone Sweet and Ryan may have
conceded too much ground to states in their pluralist constitutionalism
(see three different approaches to this tension: from Sadurski – they concede
toomuch deferential legitimacy to states; Benhabib – potential compatibility
via dialogic constitutionalism; andCorradetti – the CLOactually legitimizes
participating states as representatives of a unifying will), given the tensions
manifest in contemporary international relations, it could also be argued
that this weaker transitional approach is practically needed, particularly if
any form of cosmopolitan advancement is to gain traction.
For Stone Sweet andRyan, a cosmopolitan legal order (CLO) is defined as
a multi-level, transnational legal system in which: (1) justiciable rights are
held by individuals; (2) all public officials bear an obligation to fulfil the
fundamental rights of every personwithin their jurisdiction, without respect
to nationality or citizenship; and (3) both domestic and transnational judges
supervise how officials do so. What is distinctively Kantian about this order
is that it fulfils three key principles underwriting Kant’s moral and legal
thought: first, that the ultimate unit ofmoral concern is the dignity of human
beings and their agency as ends in themselves; second, that the moral status
of freedom attaches to everyone equally under a coexisting multi-level
condition of external freedom; and third, that the moral demand of external
freedom should be universally cosmopolitan in its legal application, regard-
less of race, nationality, social status, religious belief or other particularisms.
Nevertheless, understanding that Kant offers scant detail regarding the
institutional arrangements necessary for a functioning cosmopolitan order,
the authors fill this lacuna by outlining a combination of domestic, interna-
tional and cosmopolitan legal structures necessary to render a CLO as a
condition of public right. As part of this effort, Stone Sweet andRyan outline
two necessary conditions: (1) the existence of a transnational system of
human rights protection (fulfilling CLO points 1 and 2 above); and (2) a
condition of constitutional pluralism (fulfilling CLO point 3 above). This
16 See (n 12).






















































































































latter condition is institutionally grounded via arguments for ‘source plu-
ralism’ (two or more autonomous sources of judicially enforceable rights
that coexist within domestic orders) and ‘jurisdictional pluralism’, which
when combined create discrete hierarchies between national and treaty-
based courts ‘capable of asserting their own respective autonomy and
legitimacy, on the basis of separate legal instruments’.17
By adding this final pluralist component, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order
seeks to address three shortcomings usually associated with Kant’s tripartite
of cosmopolitan law. First, the CLO responds to the critique that there can
be no authoritative legal source for Kantian justice without an authoritative
world state (something Kant consistently rejected after 1793). In response,
under a CLO, legal authority is maintained via a mix of national courts and
treaty-based global commitments that, according to the authors, both
enhances legal effectiveness and results in the emergence of a nascent
treaty-based constitution representative of cosmopolitan right (Kant’s ulti-
mate ideal condition – and note that Perpetual Peacewaswritten in the form
of a treaty). Second, the pluralist component of the CLO satisfies Kant’s
demand for a voluntarist federation of individual states, from which states
remain self-legislators (Willkür) while co-constituting a mutually consistent
condition of external freedom (cosmopolitan right). Lastly, the juris-
iterative CLO accommodates Kant’s unwillingness to frontload predictions
about the final institutional complexion of a cosmopolitan order, thus
adopting Kant’s suggestion for a ‘gradual’ and iterative form of
constitutionalization,18 ‘which may eventually be regulated by public laws,
thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan consti-
tution’.19 As Benhabib suggests in her contribution, Stone Sweet and Ryan
seemingly render a Kantian form of dialogic constitutionalism, with the aim
that the iterative development of a ‘cosmopolitan commons’ will be able to
‘mediate the republican ideal of self-government with the trusteeship role of
the courts’. (Benhabib remains cautiously optimistic.)
In order to ground Kant’s theory in practice, Stone Sweet and Ryan argue
that such a Kantian CLO emerged in post 1998 Europe as a product of the
combined constitutionalization effects of Protocol no. 11 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (individual applications directly to
the ECtHR) as well as the incorporation of the ECHR into national law (the
basis of constitutional pluralism). Protocol no. 11 (together with Protocol
No. 14) established a fundamental change in the machinery of the ECHR.
17 See (n 8) 82.
18 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ in H Reiss, Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1970) 104 [8:356]
19 Ibid, 108 [8:360-1].






















































































































The ECtHR was given compulsory jurisdiction and states could no longer
ratify the ECHR without accepting the jurisdiction of the ECtHR; the
judicial functions of the Committee of Ministers (which is a political body)
were also abolished. This enhanced the effectiveness of the Convention,
since it sought to address chronic failures of rights protection at the national
level (thus intersecting Kantian foundations for co-constrained domestic
and international right). Incorporation made Convention rights directly
enforceable by national judges, as a matter of domestic law. By doing so,
it is argued that Convention rights further ground the necessary Kantian
interlink between domestic justice, international justice and enforceable
legal mechanization, from which a condition of external freedom (public
right) can ultimately be adjudicated.
This resulting system is governed by what Stone Sweet and Ryan call a
‘decentralized sovereign’– namely, a community of courts whose activities
are coordinated through the rulings of the European Court, based in Stras-
bourg. Although imperfect and still maturing, Stone Sweet and Ryan argue
that the regimemeets significant criteriaof legal effectiveness,which isoften a
critique made against Kantian legal theorists and cosmopolitans more
broadly. Furthermore, in responding to Kant’s ‘authority problem’, Stone
Sweet andRyanhighlight that theECHRregime routinely succeeds in raising
standards of rights protection and has helped to anchor transitions to
constitutional democracy in post-authoritarian states (intersecting Kant’s
tripartite of law – domestic, international and cosmopolitan right). More-
over, in linewithKant’s prognosis of a ‘gradual furtherance’of cosmopolitan
right, the ECtHR has steadily developed the capacity to render justice to all
personswho come under the jurisdiction ofmember states, even non-citizens
who live – andwhose rights are violated – beyondEurope (fulfilling elements
of Kant’s cosmopolitan right and laws of hospitality – see Bjorge).20 Today,
the authors argue, the ECHR comprises an important component of an
emerging cosmopolitan constitution, while the ECtHR represents the single
most active and important rights protectingbody in theworld (representing a
form of emerging cosmo-constitutionalization). The importance of this final
point is echoed by two of the contributing authors in this symposium,
namely, that the ECtHR influences a number of states (Po Jen Yap) and an
increasing number of regional human rights bodies (Sandholtz), inwhich it is
possible to interpret the potentiality for a cross-cultural and inter-
jurisdictional cosmo-constitutionalization. Bjorge concludes that the
ECtHR is indeed a cosmopolitan legal order and, moreover, the only inter-
national legal order ever properly to have attained those characteristics.
20 See Bjorge’s contribution to this symposium.






















































































































Although the book presents a compelling and well-argued position, it will
no doubt have its detractors. In terms of its use of Kant, one expected
criticism of the book involves ongoing debates about how to understand
the relationship between Kant’s notions of internal and external freedom,
human dignity and public right. For some, it will be deemed inappropriate to
simply associate contemporary notions of human rights with Kant’s discus-
sion of public right, because it is argued that Kant was concerned primarily
with grounding internal moral duties towards a condition of justice (public
right), not necessarily with the protection of personal entitlements, as are
many modern right-based theories and the ECtHR.21 For others, the key to
understanding public right rests in Kant’s commitment to republicanism as
the ultimate source of external freedom and not, as others have claimed, a
natural law reading of pre-political inalienable rights.22
Alternatively, like Stone Sweet and Ryan, others argue that Kant either
explicitly demands the protection of ‘innate rights’, which are closely syn-
onymous with our current understanding of human rights,23 or that Kant
maintained a natural law understanding of human moral dignity, which
demands legal codification into human-based law.24 From these readings, it
is often argued that there are strong correlations between Kant’s metaphys-
ical foundations for the legitimate conditions of justice and contemporary
treatments of human rights law.
To be clear, and in defence ofACosmopolitan Legal Order, it is doubtful
that there will ever be full agreement on whether or not it is appropriate to
advance a human rights readingofKant.Ashas been argued elsewhere, there
is textual and secondary evidence to support each of the aforementioned
claims,withmany of us remaining agnostic on the subject.25 Even in terms of
trying to locate a preponderance of textual evidence, there are simply too
many tensions in Kant’s writings, which allow for multifarious viable read-
ings.Moreover, Kant is often ambiguous in his contemporaneous reflections
on debates about ‘the rights of man’ and its manifestations in the American
and French revolutions. For many of us, the best option is to merely suggest
that the final answer on the human rights debate remains open, but that in
21 Onora O’Neill, ‘Transnational Justice’ in Political Theory Today, edited by David Held
(Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995) 276–304.
22 Kjartan Koch Mikalsen, ‘Kantian Republicanism in the International Sphere: Equal
Sovereignty as a Condition of Global Justice’ in Kant’s Cosmopolitics, edited by Garrett Wallace
Brown and Áron Telegdi-Csetri (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2019); see also Benha-
bib’s contribution in this issue.
23 Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights (University of Wales Press,
Cardiff, 2001).
24 Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1996).
25 See (n 10) 59–66, 198–202.






















































































































exploringaKantian formof cosmopolitan law, it is still heuristically valuable
to investigate whether human rights are a reasonable method to politically
organize individuals and states into a legal condition of public right. In other
words, although Kant may or may not have envisioned human rights as we
currently understand them, rights are existing legal inventions that can
contribute to the institutionalization of public right. In addition, human
rights seemingly have the capacity to intersect with and harmonize Kant’s
tripartite levels of intra-state, inter-state and cosmopolitan law (as depicted
in the CLO). This ability to harmonize the legal tripartite is a necessary
feature ofKant’s cosmopolitanism, andhemakes this perfectly clearwhenhe
claims that ‘if the principle of outer freedom limited by law is lacking in any
one of these three possible forms of rightful condition, the framework of all
the others is unavoidably undermined andmust finally collapse’.26Given the
fact that human rights (as we know them today) allow embryonic intersec-
tions to exist between Kant’s tripartite of law (see Po Jen Yap’s contribution
on the importance of Kant’s first definitive article – republicanism), it is
foolhardy not to explore the heuristic value of a Kantian rights-based
approach (whether or not this was his original intent), especially if this
exploration can resonate more fully with what Jürgen Habermas calls our
‘lifeworld’.27 Nevertheless, taking a reconstructive rights-based approach
will induce another potential methodological objection to A Cosmopolitan
Legal Order, since it will no doubt raise heckles of strict Kant scholars who
lament ‘neo-Kantian appropriations’ that fill in too many voids with exog-
enousmaterial and/or thatdonot remainfixatedon the existing internal logic
of Kant (with corresponding exegetical compliance).
Again, there are reasons to suggest that holding this methodological
viewpoint is too narrow-minded and that a proper division of ‘Kantian’
labour is still useful. First, in plain language, such a narrow methodology
simply stifles political imagination and any reasonable effort to apply Kant’s
ideas and careful approximations of his work to contemporary debates.
Although Kant could not have imagined the world as it is today, this does
notnecessarilymeanhis ideashavenovalue forour current thinking. Second,
exegetical strictness in many ways goes against Kant’s own ideas about
enlightenment and human progress. This is because Kant himself suggested
an evolutionary nature to political development towards a kingdom of ends,
which he suggests required multiple generations and continuous moral and
political reflections and innovations.28 As Kant argues, progress requires
26 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1996 [1797]) 89 [6:311].
27 See (n 12).
28 See (n 10) 22.






















































































































‘incalculable series of generations, each passing on its enlightenment to the
next’.29 Furthermore, Kant encourages us to ‘abstract at the present from
current hindrances, which . . . are occasioned by the neglect of genuine
ideas’.30 Third, as others have argued, there is nothing disingenuous or
fanciful about ‘making use of Kant to go beyond Kant’,31 since this is part
and parcel of the history of political ideas and to claim otherwisewould be to
deny a key driver of historical change. Fourth, in terms of the type of
exploration found inACosmopolitan LegalOrder, there is textual evidence
to suggest that Kant himself invited us to think imaginatively with his own
unfinished cosmopolitan ideas. As Kant stated in the appendix to his essay
Perpetual Peace (his most applied vision of cosmopolitan order), ‘as for
cosmopolitan right, I pass over it here in silence, for its maxims are easy to
formulate and assess on account of its analogy with international right’.32 If
nothing else, this statement demonstrates Kant’s willingness to allow others
to help finish his thoughts about the ‘principle of public right’ and to think
throughhis ideas in applicationbeyondwhat hewas able to do inhis lifetime.
Lastly, as has been argued elsewhere, there is methodological coherence in
making adistinctionbetweenwhatKantmayhave actually believed (if that is
possible to know) and a ‘reconstruction that consciously attempts to capture
his best-known philosophical tenets’.33 The key to legitimating this latter
approach is to be forthright about what is being directly attributed to Kant
and what is being augmented or reworked in line with his well-known
precepts in a deliberate attempt to move the argument forward.
Thus, in regard to the appropriateness of using Kant for contemporary
expressions of legal cosmopolitanism, it is clear that the arguments posited
in A Cosmopolitan Legal Order represent what Stone Sweet and Ryan
readily disclose as a ‘Kantian-congruent’ exploration in the fashion outlined
above. More specifically, the book represents an analysis in which the
political and legal dynamics of the ECHR are explained as congruent with
a Kantian cosmopolitan framework. Although this may not strictly reflect
Kant the cosmopolitan (see Sadurski’s concern about this in this issue), it
nevertheless reflects Kant’s cosmopolitanism ethos writ large, despite and in
response to Kant’s ambiguities and inconsistencies.34 This exercise not only
helps to situate Kant’s theories in contemporary practice (and vice versa),
29 Immanuel Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, in H Reiss,
Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970) 43 [8:19].
30 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (Colonial Press, London, 1900) [4:201].
31 See Hoffe (n 10) 6 ; see also Corradetti’s contribution to this issue.
32 See (n 18) 128 [8:384].
33 See (n 10) 21.
34 See Corradetti’s contribution in this issue.






















































































































but also provides us with the opportunity to think creatively about the
emergence of a cosmopolitan legal order more broadly and its substantia-
tion in both theory and practice. In light of rising tensions between neo-
sovereigntists and cosmopolitans, the book ultimately offers an important
advancement in our thinking about the role of existing law, human rights,
cosmo-constitutionalization and the possibility for the advancement of
meaningful global constitutionalism.
Finally, scholarly purity bordering on historicism will exclude Kant
scholars from the field. Applied research, particularly when other academic
disciplines are involved, nodoubthas its ownchallenges.Nevertheless, itwill
make important contributions to the development of political and judicial
institutions at the domestic and international levels. This is important –
especially since lawyers as advisers to states and international organizations,
judges, other kinds of practitioners and legal scholars are inherently oriented
towards systemic coherenceand incremental development,35 andwill look to
new ideas to help adapt to the emergence of a legal order analysed in A
Cosmopolitan Legal Order. This has practical merit, since they are only one
group of the book’s prospective users (and abusers).
As with all research, the decisive question for reflection is: Does this form
of applied research, in interaction with more traditional academic Kant
scholarship, have anything meaningful to say? The motivation for our
symposium in Global Constitutionalism was to engage with and better
explore the theoretical implications and practical legal ramifications of A
Cosmopolitan Legal Order. The six contributors to this issue were selected
based on their specialist expertise onKantian legal theory, human rights law
and/or global constitutionalism. In commissioning the contributions, we
simply sent each author a copy of the book and asked them to focus on a
particular aspect of Stone Sweet and Ryan’s argument that resonated with
their own interests or that sparked concern. As a result, the contributions in
this symposium reflect a wide range of specialist examinations and therefore
there is no overarching theme. That said, two broad themes naturally
emerged; these are discussed below.
II. The CLO and its universal scope
A number of authors sought to investigate the universal applicability of
Stone Sweet and Ryan’s particular form of CLO. Po Jen Yap argues that
35 Armin von Bogdandy,MatthiasGoldmann and IngoVenzke, FromPublic International to
International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Author-
ity, Research Paper No. 2016-02 (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & Interna-
tional Law, Heidelberg, 2016).






















































































































there are promising signs regarding the use of proportionally analysis in
Asia. As he outlines, European-styled proportionality analysis is evident in
both the Taiwanese and South Korean judicial systems, with a number of
important adjudications underscoring its potency, as suggested of a CLO.
Yet Yapwarns that these Asian examples are seemingly linked exclusively to
democratic states, since there is no meaningful use of proportionality in
authoritative Asian regimes such as China or Singapore. His contribution
thus champions the ability of proportionality analysis to act as a generaliz-
able tool for cosmo-constitutionalization outside of Western contexts, but
he warns that it is dependent on democratic states – something Kant also
claimed to be a necessary condition for a cosmopolitan legal order under his
first definitive article.
To broaden the potentiality for a CLO beyond the ECtHR, Wayne
Sandholtz argues that there are promising signs of cosmo-constitutionalism
within a number of key global and regional human rights instruments. In
outlining the potential for a larger CLO, Sandholtz suggests that there exists
a form of ‘judicial dialogue among the regional human rights courts’ and
that this creates an informal and decentralized coordination mechanism.
Sandholtz argues that this allows an environment for increased institution-
alization and constitutionalization between a plurality of legal mechanisms
and adjudications, which in line with the ECtHR ‘provide amodel and focal
point for the emergence of transregional constructions of rights review’.
In many ways the arguments of Po Jen Yap and Sandholtz offer a
reasonable response to critics, who will argue that the ECHR and ECtHR
merely represent a European affair born of a particular regional historywith
a unique set of philosophical traditions. First, as Sandholtz notes, the ECHR
reaches beyond European Union member states in terms of signatories,
which suggests that the ECHR’s influence is not necessarily confined to
being merely a European project. Therefore, although the ECHR certainly
comes from a ‘particular place’, its appeal can resonate beyond that place,
becoming diffused, adapted, amalgamated and implemented within new
global contexts – which, as Kant rightly notes, is how cosmopolitical
foundations will ultimately ‘spread further and further’ over time. Second,
as argued by a number of contributors, the CLO as outlined by Stone Sweet
and Ryan is explicitly Kant-congruent and thus tightly bound within that
internal logic. As a result, in line with Kant, the CLO must begin by
exploring Kant’s transitional legal mechanisms and then move forward to
locate practices that exhibit nascent transboundary characteristics, which
can transcend existing regional politics in theory and practice. Again, this
transitional iterative process is exactly how Kant himself envisaged the
development of any CLO, arguing that a CLO would need to spread
organically (not to be imposed from above), from ideas of a single






















































































































enlightened state or from a small group of like-minded states. From this
standpoint, theCLOdelivered by Stone Sweet andRyan does exactlywhat it
promised. Namely, it provides an outline of an emerging Kantian based
CLO as witnessed in the ECHR and its court, which has foundational
properties that are consistent with Kant’s vision, but also capable of expan-
sion – albeit still within Kant’s overall normative demands. Moreover,
beyond the formal mechanisms of the ECHRand its court, Sandholtz argues
that the ECtHR has influenced a number of regional human rights bodies,
again suggesting that the ECtHR exhibits transitional properties that can,
over time, provide opportunities for the emergence of an expanded CLO.
Lastly, Po Jen Yap outlines how CLO-congruent proportionality can be
witnessed inAsia, which suggests that there is promise for the non-European
adoption of a key CLO foundation. Yet, as outlined above, Yap exposes a
crucial empirical link between democratic states and proportionality. To
some this will be seen as limiting the potential reach of the CLO, rendering
the CLO a ‘separate peace’ more than a promising cosmopolitan project.
However, it is again important to reflect upon what is being offered in the
analysis of the CLO. For Kant, as well as for Stone Sweet and Ryan, the aim
is to provide a cosmopolitan blueprint, one that can locate key cosmopolitan
ingredients (such as democracy) as well as potential legal pathways. What
the analysis of the CLO delivers is both: a set of key moral foundations
backed by legal procedures, which when combined, fulfils the basic tenets of
Kant’s cosmopolitan vision.Neither Kant nor the authors in this symposium
would dare to claim that the CLO has reached a fully-fledged cosmopolitan
legal order, or that a cosmopolitan global constitution will teleologically
materialize from its foundations. The claim is merely that there is a nascent
CLO in existence, with unique cosmopolitan potential, from which we can
learn and draw enthusiasm from in an effort to rethink an emerging global
constitution and ongoing processes of global constitutionalization writ
large.
Further broadening the reach of the CLO, Eirik Bjorge’s contribution
concerns two discrete aspects of Stone Sweet andRyan’s theory: (1) what the
KantianCLOmeans for an international court; and (2)what it means for the
holders of the rights that flow from the cosmopolitan legal order. He
compares the ECtHR with the CJEU, before turning to the extent to which,
in order to be considered a truly cosmopolitan legal order, the European
Convention needs at times to not only make non-citizens free of rights equal
to those of citizens, but also to give them stronger rights than those enjoyed
by citizens. Bjorge concludes that the ECtHR is indeed a cosmopolitan legal
order and, moreover, that it is the only international legal order to have
properly attained those characteristics. He concludes with one of the ideas
on which the authors end their study: the meaning of the European






















































































































Convention beyond its European context. Many writers have touched on
variations of this question. The French post-war statesman Louis Armand,
for example, wrote in 1968 that ‘L’Europe n’est plus l’Europe mais seule-
ment un morceau du monde.’36 Bjorge cites Kant’s The Contest of Faculties
on the French Revolution: if it is difficult to prove progress in history, the
study of history nevertheless allows the observer to discern signs that real
progress is possible. The French Revolution was such a sign – what hap-
pened in France in 1789 had until then been entirely unthinkable: men and
women raising the standard of revolt in the face of the power of the king.
More important than the reality of the French Revolution, however, was the
enthusiasm engendered by the fact that it came into being. This, Bjorge
argues, applies to the ECHR and the ECtHR. The European system for the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms may fail or succeed,
yet the enthusiasm that this single most successful rights-protecting body in
theworld has created in bystanders, and the very fact that it came into being,
prove that real progress is possible. Bjorge concludes that, from a Kantian
perspective, this may well be its greatest accomplishment.
III. Tensions between the CLO and self-determination
A theme present in all contributions was a concern about the delicate
balance struck by the CLO between the universal rights-based adjudicative
power of the trustee courts and the role of state self-determination allowed
within constitutional pluralism. For Sadurski, there is a concern that the
CLO too easily abandons Kant’s concern about determining the right
reasons for restricting freedom under a condition of public right. Although
Sadurski does not use the language below, he does suggest that Kant places
considerable justificatory weight on the principle of publicity, which out-
lines appropriate negative and positive political motivations to determine
the legitimacy of a legal maxim. The negative test relates directly to identi-
fying maxims that morally violate the principle of public right and are thus
immediately deemed inappropriate for domestic law, international law and
cosmopolitan law. Correspondingly, the positive test is to identify maxims
that are both consistent and complementary with the interest of public right.
Through this, the principle of publicity asserts that maxims that do not fail
the test, or in fact promote public right, are required to be made public and
are therefore ‘reconciled with both right and politics’.37 Accordingly, Kant
further maintains that maxims that can satisfy this rule also ‘conform to the
36 Bernard Stirn, Towards a European Public Law (trans Eirik Bjorge, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2017) 182.
37 See (n 18) 130 [8:386].






















































































































universal aim of the public’.38 If this is so, then it raises a concern that a
ECtHR-based CLO, as outlined by Stone Sweet and Ryan, remains too
deferential in accepting at face value the motivational legitimacy of states in
restricting rights (freedoms). In contrast, Sadurski argues, ‘a Kantian per-
spective on the ECtHR would call for attention to the Court’s scrutiny of
member states’ reasons for legislation expressed in the quality of the aims
they pursue, while putatively engaging Convention rights’. The implications
for a CLO, as implied by Sadurski, is that it surrenders too much ground,
thus weakening the ECtHR’s cosmopolitan potential as well as its Kantian
foundations.
Alternatively, looking from the bottom up, Benhabib relates a concern
that the CLOunderplays the importance Kant places on republican and self-
legislated law. Unlike Sadurski’s concern about the trustee court being too
weak, Benhabib suggests that the CLO overly ‘slants’ Kant’s cosmopolitan-
ism toward ‘courts and judicial supremacy’. Moreover, argues Benhabib, it
is not clear how trusteeship power over legislative practices is delegated by
the people who are subject to its jurisdiction, nor why this form of judicial
review would have any democratic legitimacy. Despite these concerns,
Benhabib remains cautiously optimistic about the ability of the CLO to
render issues of state self-determination and human right’s trusteeship
compatible. This is especially so, argues Benhabib, if we understand the
CLO as a form of dialogic constitutionalism. By dialogic constitutionalism,
it is important to understand the CLO not as ‘authoritative’ per se, but
‘editorial’, in that it maintains the necessary ‘guardrails’ to protect a self-
legislated systemof rights, where the protection of certain personal freedoms
associated with autonomous self-law giving would be mandatory.
Corradetti explains the ECHR and the ECtHR as a representation of a
transitional form of cosmopolitanism and a realistic progression toward a
Kantian cosmopolitan constitution and perpetual peace. He accepts the
views of Stone Sweet and Ryan on the Strasburg Court as a legitimate
update of the Kantian project. He highlights how Stone Sweet and Ryan
sees the ECtHR as an “omnilateral trustee” court which safeguards citizens’
basic rights without emptying the authoritative power of states. In doing so,
Corradetti supports Stone Sweet andRyan’s moderate ‘transitional’ reading
of cosmopolitan law, which he suggests can better satisfy state-based self-
legislation while legitimizing external relations between states. Four princi-
ples balance domestic sovereignty and international authority: proportion-
ality, subsidiarity, the margin of national appreciation, and consensus of
states. Without subscribing to all aspects of Stone Sweet’s and Ryan’s
argument, Corradetti maintains that a poliarchy of transnational
38 See (n 37).






















































































































arrangements (not only courts) best promotes a Kantian project among
global constitutional trajectories, which also fits well into Habermas’s
transitional model.39
IV. A CLO for the future?
The authors in this symposium find support for the emergence of, and
increasing prospects for, Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan’s CLO. The
investigation into the applicability of Stone Sweet and Ryan’s particular
form of CLO goes beyond Europe. At the same time, the authors in the
symposium recognize broad-based critiques against the CLO, perceive the
tensions that exist in its practice and voice concerns about its future in
Europe and at a global level, not the least from the neo-sovereigntist position
increasingly adopted in the United States and elsewhere. Aswementioned at
the outset, current populist challenges are testing both the European Court
of Human Rights and the idea of an expanding CLO. Yet the aim here is not
to predict the future trajectory of human rights, the ECHR or the future of
cosmopolitanism, since this would go beyond the scope of this symposium.
Particularly in terms of the universal appeal of theCLO,we can emphasize
the importance of reflecting upon Kant’s logic and the history of cosmopol-
itan thinking more generally – namely, the basic cosmopolitan principle
regarding the universal value of human dignity that has been in existence
much longer than many of its theoretical alternatives (since Akhnaton in
1375 BCE, for example), including notions of state sovereignty. As a result,
any confident prediction of the demise of cosmopolitanism should be viewed
with suspicion, since it represents a rather ahistorical position that ignores
historical resilience. Moreover, as Kant rightly claims, we live on a bounded
sphere. This is an empirical reality that, as Kant claims, ‘provides the
occasion for troubles in one place on our global to be felt all over’.40 Under
globalization, these troubles have now become painfully acute – far more so
thanKant could have imagined in 1793. If nothing else, whatwas true then is
even more true now, and the CLO offers a blueprint for how it might be
possible to move from ‘current hindrances’ to a civil order that can admin-
ister justice universally. In this light, ‘the idea of cosmopolitan right [under a
CLO] is not fantastic or overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the
unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a
universal right of humanity’.41
39 See (n 13).
40 See (n 26) 121 [6:353].
41 See (n 18) 108 [8:360].
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